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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Laws of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 5
DUTIES AND RIGHTS WHERE MORE PERSONS THAN
ONE ARE PROMISORS OR PROMISEES OF THE
SAME PERFORMANCE**
Section 124. EFFECT ON OBLIGED'S RIHTS OF A CONTRACT NOT
TO SUE A CO-PROMIsOR.
A contract by the person entitled to receive performance
not to sue one or more joint, or joint and several promisors
is not violated by making such promisors defendants in a
suit on the joint promise and obtaining judgment against
them, if none of their assets are seized by the plaintiff in
entire or partial satisfaction of the judgment. But a con-
tract that one or more of such promisors shall not be sued
or made answerable by anyone upon the joint promise is
violated if any of their assets are seized or they are in any
way made answerable either by the person entitled to re-
ceive performance or by a co-promisor.
comment
a. One of a number of co-promisors may suffer loss on breach
of his promise m either of two ways firstly, by having his property
directly levied upon by the creditors, or, secondly, by being com-
pelled to give contribution or mdemmty after the creditor has
levied on the assets of the other promisors. The Section distin-
guishes contracts with the creditor which will protect a promisor
from loss of the first kind from those which will protect him from
both kinds.
Section 125. SUwvIVORsmP OF JOINT DUTIEs.
On the death of a joint promisor in a contract when one
or more of the joint promisors are still surviving, the estate
of the deceased promisor is not bound by the joint promise
unless all of the surviving joint promisors are insolvent;
nor in that event if the deceased promisor was a surety
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found oir the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
Athletic Club, 172 Wash. 305, 20 Pac. (2d) 21 (1933). Accord and satis-
faction is an affirmative defense and the burden of proving it rests on
the party who pleads it. Hargrave v. Colfax, 89 Wash. 467, 154 Pac. 824
(1916) Glenz v. Tacoma By. & Power Co., note 36, supra, Hackett v.
McIntosh, note 80, supra, Anderson v. Sanitarj Dairy Inc., note 24, supra.
However, the defense need not be averred in technical language. Har-
grave v. Colfax, note 93, supra, First National Bank v. White-Dulaney
Co., note 40, supra. A receipt in full given by the creditor to the debtor
is evidence of accord and. satisfaction, Pederson v. Tacoma, note 26, supra,
and where uncontradicted will of itself support the defense. Green 'v.
Fuller, 159 Wash. 691, 294 Pac. 1037 (1930) It is not, however, con-
clusive and may be contradicted by parol. Simons v. Hallidie Co., note
88, supra.
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Comment
a. Where joint promisors are also severally bound, the principle
of survivorship is not applicable to the several duties.
This Section and Section 128 relate merely to the duties of the
promisors because of their joint promise. What rights a surviving
promisor who has been compelled to pay may have against the
estate of a deceased joint promisor is not under consideration in
this Chapter.
ANNOTATION
Washington cases are contra to this Section.
Brownfield v. Holland, 63 W 86, 114 P 890 (1911) held that under Rem.
& Bal. Code, Sections 1344, 179, 189, 153, 1535, 406, 407, and 236, the com-
mon law rule that the death of a joint debtor terminates his liability at
law is abolished and an action may be maintained against the executors
of a deceased joint tenant and the surviving joint tenant for rent accru-
ing before or after the death of the joint tenant; id., Megrath V. Gilmore,
15 W 558, 46 P 1032 (1896) and the estate of a deceased joint con-
-tractor is liable even though deceased was only a surety, Donnerberg v.
Oppenheimer 15 W 290, 46 P. 254 (1896) Olson v. Seldoma Salmon Co.,
89 W 547, 154 P 1107 (1916) the administrator of a deceased prin-
cipal and the latter's surety upon a joint and several bond, upon rejec-
tion by the probate court of a claim by the obligee against the admin-
istrator, may be joined as defendants in a suit upon the bond, Spokane
v. Costello, 57 W 183, 106 P. 764 (1910)
Section 126. EFFECT oF DEATH OF ALL JOINT PROMISORS.
On the death of the last survivor of two or more joint
promisors in a contract his estate is bound by the contract.
Section 127 APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS 85-93 TO SEVERAL, TO
JOINT, AND TO JOINT AND SEVERAL CONTRACTS.
The principles of Sections 85-93 are applicable to sev-
eral and to joint and to joint and several contracts, so far as
concerns the power of a promisor to create a new contract
binding himself, or to vary his own previous duty, but one
promisor has no power to affect other promisors unless they
have actually or apparently authorized him to do so.
Section 128. WHEN PROMISES TO SEVERAL PERSONS CREATE
SEVERAL, JOINT, OR JOINT AND SEVERAL RIGHTS.
(1) If a promise in a contract is made to several persons,
the intention of the promisor as expressed in the contract
determines whether the right thereby created is joint or
whether rights are created which are several or are joint
and several.
(2) If no intention is expressed in such a promise, the
rights are several if the interests of the obligees in the per-
formance of the promise are distinct; but if their interests
in its performance are joint, or if any one of the obligees
has neither a separate nor a joint interest in the perform-
ance, the right is joint.
Comment
a. The interest of a promisor or promisee in the performance of
a promse, or in the consideration received for it, does not mean
sentimental interest or desire but a material or pecuniary interest.
Thus partners have a common interest in the performance of a
promise to or by them with reference to partnership matters, and
in the consideration given or received for such a promise. They
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are jointly concerned with the welfare of the partnership, and are
co-owners of the partnership property On the other hand where
a principal and surety promise that a certain performance shall
take place, the performance of the promise affects their interests
differently Moreover the fact that they are principal and surety
probably indicates that the principal received the consideration
for the promises and that the surety derived no material or pecuni-
ary advantage from it. There is no common interest between the
principal and surety either with reference to the performance of
the promise or the consideration for it.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (2). If only one of two obligees of a garnishment bond has
sustained damage he may maintain action therein without joining the
other obligee as plaintiff, and if in such action a demurrer is sustained
for non-joinder of the other obligee, and an amended complaint is filed
in which both obligees are joined as plaintiffs, defendants are estopped
from contending that recovery cannot be had on the amended complaint
by either party because of lack of interest of one of the plaintiffs, Harnng-
ton v. Gordon, 42 W 692, 80 P. 187 (1905).
Section 129. PARTIES TO ACTIONS BY JOINT OBLIGEES.
An action to enforce a joint right under a contract must
be brought by or in the name of all surviving obligees.
Comment
a. The persons having a joint right will generally be promisees,
but where third party beneficiaries are allowed to enforce a promise,
the joint right may be that of such beneficiaries.
Section 130. POWER OF A JOINT OBLIGEE TO SuE, DISCHARGE on
RECEIvE TENDER ON BEH AT OF Co-OBLiGEES.
Except as the rules of this Section are qualified by Sec-
tion 131,
(a) any joint obligee may sue for the enforcement of
the promise in the name of all the joint obligees; he
also has the power to discharge the promisor by col-
lection and receipt of the performance promised or
by release or otherwise;
(b) a discharge by a joint obligee of his individual right
operates as a discharge of the joint right of all,
(c) a tender to one of several persons jointly entitled is
equivalent to a tender to all of them.
Section 131. EFFECT OF FRAUDULENT EXERCISE OF THE POWERS
OF A JOn-T OBLGEE.
(1) If an obligee attempts or threatens to discharge the
promisor in fraud of a co-obligee, whether joint, several,
or joint and several, the co-obligee may obtain an injunc.
tion forbidding such discharge.
(2) A discharge of the promisor by an obligee in fraud of
a co-obligee is inoperative to discharge the promisor's duty
to the extent of the co-obligee's interest in the performance,
if the promisor gives no value or knows, or has reason to
know of the fraud.
Section 132. SURVIVORSHIP OF JOINT RIGHTS.
On the death of a joint obligee, the surviving obligees, if
more than one, become the only joint obligees. If but one
obligee survives he becomes the sole obligee; and on the
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death of the last surviving obligee, his estate becomes solely
entitled to performance by the obligor.
Comment
a. The duty of the surviving obligee to account to the estate of
a deceased obligee is not here under consideration.
CHAPTER 6
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS NOT
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT
Section 133. DEFINITION OF DONEE BENEFICIARY, CREDITOR
BENEFICIARY, INCIDENTAL BENEFICIARY.
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will
benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is,
except as stated in Subsection (3)
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of
the promise in view of the accompanying circum-
stances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining
the promise of all or part of the performance there-
of is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer
upon him a right against the promisor to some per-
formance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be
due from the promisee to the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift
appears from the terms of the promise in view of
the accompanying circumstances and performance
of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a
right of the beneficiary against the promisee which
has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a
discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable
because of the Statute of Frauds;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated
in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exist.
(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (la) is
a gift promise. Such a promise as is described in Subsection
(lb) is a promise to discharge the promisee's duty
(3) Where it appears from the terms of the promise in
view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose
of the promisee is to benefit a beneficiary under a trust and
the promise is to render performance to the trustee, the
trustee, and not the beneficiary under the trust, is a bene-
ficiary within the meaning of this Section.
Comment
a. A single contract may consist of a number of promises. One
or more of them may require performance to the promisee, others
may require performance to persons not parties to the contract.
Of these latter promises, some may be of the type stated in Sub-
section (la.), others of the type stated in Subsection (lb) In
other promises any benefit derived by a third person from their
performance may be merely incidental.
b By performance of a promise is to be understood doing the
acts or forbearances undertaken by the promisor-not the dis-
charge of a legal duty though such a discharge may be one of the
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consequences of doing what the promisor undertakes, whether that
is positive action or negative refraining from action.
c. By gift is meant primarily some performance or right which
is not paid for by the recipient and which is apparently designed
to benefit him. There are also covered by Subsection (la) cases
where, though the proinisee receives consideration from the bene-
ficiary, there is manifested an intent that the beneficiary shall ac-
quire a right against the pronisor to some performance never due
or supposed or asserted to be done to the beneficiary from the
promisee (see Illustration 3)
d. A contract for the benefit of a hird person usually provides
that performance shall be rendered directly to the beneficiary, but
this is not necessarily the case. A promise to discharge an indebted-
ness of one whom the contract is made to benefit, will provide for
payment to the creditor of the beneficiary, not to the beneficiary
himself who owes the money
e. Contractual rights of a beneficiary must be distinguished
from interests in chattels created by the delivery of the chattels to
one person with the expressed intent that another shall have an
interest in them. The rights thus acquired are independent of the
law of contracts. On the other hand, delivery of chattels to one
person with the expressed intent that he shall be merely an agent
in their delivery to another creates no right in the latter either
under the law of property or of contracts.
ANNOTATION
The Washington cases, although recognizing generally the third party
beneficiary doctrine, do not make distinctions between the three types of
beneficiaries recognized by the Restatement. Clarity would result from
recognizing these distinctions and adopting the terminology of the Re-
statement.
Subsection (1) (a). No Washington case (insurance cases excepted)
has been found squarely involving a donee beneficiary. The language in
some cases is, however, broad enough to cover the situation. In Gilmore
v. Skoocum Box Factory, 20 W 703, 56 P. 934 (1899), a creditor bene-
ficiary case, the court said: "Trhe rule (third party beneficiary) has for
its basis a new consideration, moving from the promisor to the promisee,
creating a liability on the part of the promisor to pay the beneficiary of
the promise in any event, and srrespective of any debt due from the
promssee to suck beneficiary." This language was approved in Corkrell V.
Poe, 100 W 625, 630, 171 P. 522 (1918). Corkrell v. Poe (supra) may
be a true donee beneficiary case since it permitted recovery by a mort-
gagee against a grantee who assumed the mortgage debt even though
defendant's immediate grantor was not obligated on the debt. See Willis-
ton, Contracts, Section 386.
The right of the beneficiary (donee) of a life insurance policy to main-
tain an action on the policy is provided for by statute. R. C. S. Sections
7230-1.
Subsection (1) (b) The creditor beneficiary situation, although not
so designated, has been recognized in a number of cases. Creditor of
vendor when vendee agrees, as part of purchase price, to pay the debt;
BSisby v. Frost, 3 W Terr. 388, 17 P. 887 (1888) Don Yook v. Washing-
ton Mill Co., 16 W 459, 47 P. 964 (1897) Gilmore v. Skookluz Box Fac.
tory, 20 W 703, 56 P. 934 (1899) Reiley v. Spokane Sanitary Laundry Co.,
71 W 516, 128 P. 1075 (1913).
Mortgagee wherein purchaser of the mortgaged premises assumes the
mortgage debt; Solicitors' Loan and Trust Co. v. Robzns, 14 W 507, 45
P. 39 (1896) equitable subrogation theory of Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S.
610 followed; Ordway v. Downey, 18 W 412, 51 P. 1047 (1898) Harbwan
V. Chamberlin, 82 W 556, 144 P. 717 (1914) Corkrell v. Poe, 100 W 625,
171 P. 522 (1918) First State Bank of Arneson, 109 W 346, 186 P. 889
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(1920) Bollong v. Corinan, 117 W 336, 201 P 297 (1921) Insley v. Webb,
122 W 98, 209 P 1093 (1922) Hargzs v. Hargts, 160 W 594, 295 P 742
(1931) Frazey v. Casey, 96 W 422, 165 P 104 (1917).
Persons injured by negligence of insured under liability policy* Finkel-
berg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 W 543, 219 P 12 (1923) Stusser
v. Mutual Unzon Insurance Co., 127 W 449, 221 P 331 (1923).
Laborers and materialmen on contractor's bond: See Annotations to
Section 136 (1) a.
Other creditor beneficiary cases are: Dimrmnck v. Collins, 24 W 78, 63
P 1101 (1901) Lian v. Huglen, 141 W 369, 251 P 585 (1926) Zioncheck
v. Hepden, 144 W 272, 257 P 835 (1927) Moore v. Baasch, 109 W 568,
187 P 388 (1920).
Subsection (1) (c) Horstmamn Co. v. Waterman, 103 W 18, 173 P. 733
(1918) (semble) Hanson v. Blaclcwell Motor Co., 143 W 547, 255 P 939
(1927)
Section 134. CONTRACTS TO WHICH STATEMENTS IN THIS CHAP-
TER ARE APPLICABLE.
The statements in Sections 135-147 are applicable both
to absolute and conditional promises in either formal or m-
formal contracts.
Comment
a. By the definition of creditor beneficiary a person falls within
this designation if performance of the promise will operate to dis-
charge a real or supposed or alleged duty and is not intended in
whole or in part as a gift. It is enough that performance, if per-
formance ever becomes due, will have this effect. It may not be
known to the parties whether there is such a duty, and the promise
may be conditional on its existence (see Illustration 2)
ANNOTATION
Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 W 543, 219 P 12 (1923),
and Stusser v. Mutual Unson Insurance Co., 127 W 449, 221 P. 331 (1923)
seem to illustrate conditional promises within the meaning of the Section.
Section 135. DUTIES CREATED BY A GIFT PROMISE.
Except as stated in Section 140,
(a) a gift promise in a contract creates a duty of the
promisor to the donee beneficiary to perform the
promise; and the duty can be enforced by the donee
beneficiary for his own benefit;
(b) a gift promise also creates a duty of the promisor to
the promisee to render the promised performance to
the donee beneficiary
Comment
a. No assent by a donee beneficiary to the contract or knowledge
on his part of its existence is necessary to give him a right of action
on it.
b The damages recoverable in an action at law by the promisee
of a gift promise will generally be nominal, but in Illustration 1
under Section 133, A's damages would be $100. (A owes C $100
for money lent. For sufficient consideration B promises A to pay
C $200, both as a discharge of the debt and as an indication of A's
gratitude to C for making the loan. C is a donee beneficiary ) As
to the right of specific performance, see Section 138.
ANNOTATION
See Annotation to Section 133 (1) (a).*
The annotations to Chapter 5 were prepared in memorandum form by
the late Professor Harvey Lantz of the University of Washington Law
School. Those to Chapter 6 were prepared by Dean Harold Shepherd.
